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 Under conditions of growing population
pressure and increased market integration,
the question as to whether the spontaneous
evolution of the informal system of land
tenure can be relied upon to meet the
challenge of a modern agricultural economy
is of enormous importance. The standard
view of economists is that formalisation of
private rights in land is a necessary step to
make as soon as land becomes scarce so that
competition arises around it and agents are
willing to transact land through markets.
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The standard view of economists is that formalisation of private rights in land is
a prerequisite of economic growth, especially so in conditions of acute popula-
tion pressure and agricultutal commercialisation. That stage has been reached in
many regions of the African continent, hence the recommendation that land
rights be duly registered by a central authority acting on behalf of the state.  An
alternative view, more prevalent among social scientists, claims that, far from be-
ing bypassed by evolving scarcity circumstances, the informal (customary) land
tenure system is capable of adjusting itself to the needs of a modern agriculture
while at the same time ensuring a more equitable access to land for those whose
livelihood narrowly depends upon it.
This paper aims at assessing these two views by carefully looking at the argu-
ments advanced by their respective upholders as well as by taking stock of the
most recent empirical evidence available to test their validity.  It will be shown
that the first view is not as solidly grounded as it may seem at first sight, yet the
second view must be duly qualified to allow for serious inter-community failures
of the 'indigenous order' solution. users.  A standard response to this potentially
inefficient situation is to restrict outsiders’
access to the local resource base (see, e.g.,
Noronha, 1985; Downs and Reyna, 1988;
Bassett and Crummey, 1993 ; Laurent et al.,
1994).  But if the population of native
claimants continues to grow, the externality
problem is only postponed.1
To prevent efficiency losses following from
the uncoordinated and joint use of a resource
(the classical rent-dissipating externalities) as
well as processes of resource depletion
resulting from congestion effects, two
institutional evolutions are available.  Either
the community takes steps towards regulating
the collective use of the resource, or it accepts
its division and the consequent emergence of
individualised rights.  Under some condi-
tions, including the absence of transaction
costs, the two solutions are theoretically
equivalent and they lead to a Pareto-efficient
outcome.  In the real world, however, trans-
action costs are important and a central thesis
of the property rights school in economics is
that, given such costs, division of common
property resources and the gradual indivi-
dualisation of tenure rights are a more
efficient solution than collective regulation
under the form of adding rules of use to rules
of access.  At least, this is true for resources
that are not too much spread out and are
valuable enough to cause the benefits of
privatization to exceed the costs (whether
direct or opportunity costs).  Underlying such
a diagnosis is the belief that the governance
costs arising from collective regulation are
quite significant especially because of the
opportunistic tendencies of resource users (for
more details, see Baland and Platteau, 1998 ;
Platteau, forthcoming: Chap. 3).
When land acquires a scarcity value,
individualisation of land tenure is actually
demanded by landholders who begin to feel
uncertain about their (customary) rights.  As
a result of their attempts to assert increasingly
individualised use rights to given plots,
disputes over ownership of land, inheritance
and land boundaries tend to multiply which
are more and more difficult to resolve and
entail rising litigation costs.  Yet, with the
appreciation of land prices, the expected gain
from obtaining specific land rights justifies to
an increasing extent the transaction cost of
disputation.  This rising incidence of land
conflicts and the accompanying threats to
social order provide clear signals on which the
government is called upon to act.
That litigation causes significant efficiency
losses in the rural economy is evident since
valuable resources are spent in non-
productive activities.  What must be added is
that, even when there is no open dispute, the
strategies used by people to claim new lands
or to protect customary access are often costly
not only from a private but also from a social
viewpoint (see Meek, 1949 ; Berry, 1984: 89-
96, 1988: 62-71;  Noronha, 1985: 88-89,
208;  Le Roy, 1985;  Platteau, 1992: 163-175;
Roth, 1993: 316-317).  This is particularly
obvious when such strategies cause an
underutilisation of land resources, such as
when landholders are reluctant to land or rent
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That stage has been reached in many regions
of the African continent, hence the re-
commendation that land rights be duly
registered by a central authority acting on
behalf of the state. An alternative view, more
prevalent among social scientists, claims that,
far from being bypassed by evolving scarcity
circumstances, the informal (customary) land
tenure system is capable of adjusting itself to
the needs of a modern agriculture while at the
same time ensuring a more equitable access
to land for those whose livelihood narrowly
depends upon it.
The present paper aims at assessing these
two views by carefully looking at the
arguments advanced by their respective
upholders as well as by taking stock of the
most recent empirical evidence available to
test their validity.  In the following, I begin by
presenting the economists’ standard view
before subjecting it to a systematical appraisal.
The alternative view will naturally come out
when this systematic appraisal proceeds, since
it has largely evolved as a reaction to the
conventional doctrine of the economists.  As
for the weaknesses of the alternative view, they
will be pointed out in a final section.
The standard economic doctrine of
property rights in land
Evolution of land tenure under conditions of
growing land scarcity
When a natural resource, say land, is abund-
ant, there is by definition no competition for
it.  The critical issue is access to labour, not to
land.  In such circumstances, private property
rights in land are not useful nor economically
justifiable.
Externalities among competing users are
unimportant since when people are dispersed
over the land they have little ability to cause a
fall in the average income of their neighbours
through competition in the joint use of the
resource or through ecological spillover
effects.  In other words, when population
densities are low, an open access regime is
efficient.  The conservation of the natural
resource is not jeopardized and there is no
overcrowding effect through which additional
entries can lead to a decline in the income level
of existing producers.  In the words of a
property rights theorist : “externalities are of
such small significance that it does not pay
anyone to take them into account” and “there
is no positive value to society of creating clearly
defined property rights in land” (Johnson,
1972: 271).
Access to land does not, however, take
place in a social and political vacuum and it is
therefore incorrect to speak about an open
access regime to describe land tenure rights in
land-abundant environments.  Even though
they may not be precisely defined, territorial
boundaries do exist between different
communities or lineage-based groups which
have the corporate custody of the land within
their area of control.  In African villages, the
operation of territorial delineation actually
corresponds to a symbolic gesture whereby
the head of the founding lineage signifies that
there is a privileged association between the
delimited portion of the land area and the
social group which he represents (Platteau,
1992: 85).  Yet, rules of access remain quite
flexible and, provided that they show a real
willingness to recognize local authorities and
to follow local customs, outsiders may be
easily accommodated into communities,
through the establishing of personal links of
friendship or godparenthood.  Communities
are therefore largely porous and ethny-,
lineage- or community-based identity feelings
do not imply any attitude of rigid exclusion
vis-a-vis strangers.
When population pressure on land
intensifies, growing competition causes an
increasing incidence of externalities among
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1. Thus, for example, in the case of the Orma pastoralist communities of northeastern Kenya, elders responded to
increasing land pressure by prohibiting nomadic herders from grazing  their herds on the village common pasture.
Over the years, they strengthened this prohibition by gradually extending the period during which the local
common pasture is made inaccessible to outsiders.  Eventually, the restricted zone was declared out of bounds
to the outsiders year round.  Interestingly, however, Orma villagers continued to use the common pasture as
much as they liked and this lack of restrictions applied to insiders was not seen by them as problematic
(Ensminger, 1990: 667-69).use of the land available, on the one hand,
and dynamic effects resulting in land
conservation and improvement, on the other
hand (Demsetz, 1967; Johnson, 1972; Ault
and Rutman, 1979; De Alessi, 1980; Feder,
1987, 1993; Feder et al., 1988; Feder and
Feeny, 1991; Barzel, 1989; Libecap, 1989a;
Binswanger et al., 1995; Feder and Nishio,
1997).
More efficient use of the land can itself
arise from two distinct sources.  First, more
efficient cropping choices are made possible
because decision biases in favour of short-cycle
crops that arise from tenure insecurity are
removed when land titles are introduced.
Second, under the same circumstances, land is
transferred from less to more dynamic farmers
and consolidated into larger holdings, thereby
eliminating the excessive fragmentation and
subdivision encouraged by traditional land
allocation and inheritance patterns.  When
property rights are not clearly ascertained and
effectively enforced, willing buyers who do
not belong to the same community must incur
significant search, enforcement and litigation
costs as a result of which a wedge is driven
between the land’s value of marginal product
in the owner’s use and the value of marginal
product if used by the most productive
alternative user.  The price of land does not
then reflect its true social value.  Due to the
significant transaction costs arising from
asymmetric information, land transfers are
inhibited among stranger farmers, thus
causing the volume of land transactions to be
less than optimal.  By putting an end to
ambiguity in property rights, land titling
drastically reduces transaction costs and
encourages land acquisition by those able to
make the best use of it.
Development of the land market is often
supposed to induce a switch from subsistence
cultivation to commercial agriculture under
the impulse of dynamic, market-oriented
agricultural entrepreneurs (see, e.g., Feder 
and Noronha, 1987).  Full-fledged private
property rights do not only improve the
allocation of land among different uses and
among different users, but they also enhance
investment incentives.  The dynamic impact
of land titling on investment behaviour can
be actually decomposed into demand and
supply effects.  Or, to put it in another way,
landowners whose rights are legally protected
can be expected to be both more willing and
more able to undertake investment.  
They are more willing to invest for
essentially two reasons.  First, there is the
point made long ago by John Stuart Mill that,
when farmers are better assured of reaping the
future benefits of their present efforts and
sacrifices thanks to secure rights of use, they
have more incentives to invest in soil
conservation measures, land improvements
and other operations that raise productivity
in the long term (Mill, 1848: Book V, chap.
VIII).  This ‘assurance effect’ therefore follows
from the fact that when farmers feel more
secure in their right or ability to maintain
long-term use over their land, the return on
long-term land improvements is higher.
Conversely, lack of tenure security can be
thought of as creating a risk of land loss that
causes a decline of expected income from
investment or, alternatively, as shortening the
farmer’s time horizon, thereby discouraging
him from performing actions that yield
benefits over time.  Second, when land can be
more easily converted to liquid assets through
sale –that is, when superior transfer rights
have the effect of lowering the costs of
exchange if the land is either rented or sold–,
improvements made through investment can
be better realised, thereby increasing its
expected return.  Investment incentives are
then again enhanced (Besley, 1995c: 910-12;
Platteau, 1996c: 36).  This second effect may
be called the ‘realisability effect’.
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out their land for fear of losing their rights to
it, or when they erect makeshift structures on
the land or cultivate it in a desultory fashion
to create the illusion that it is occupied and
actually brought under cultivation.  
The expected response of national
governments to these clear signals is to carry
out administrative reforms so as to put an end
to the wasteful use of rural resources and to
the social tensions arising from land disputes.
Sooner or later, such reforms will necessarily
include a formal registration of private land
rights and full-fledged land titling procedures
(requiring the completion of a cadastral
survey).  As a consequence of formal adjudica-
tion, all conflicts will then be solved, leaving
nothing to dispute.  Social peace and political
stability will follow.   According to this view,
therefore, formal private property rights, far
from being imposed ex abrupto by public
authorities, emerge in response to a pressing
demand expressed by increasingly insecure
landholders whether directly or indirectly
(through the rising incidence of land
conflicts).   Looked at in this way, the task of
the government appears essentially non-
problematic.  It only consists of supporting a
change that is desired by everyone (including
the officials who own land themselves), that
is, of facilitating or hastening “a transition
caused by fundamental economic forces”
(Bruce, 1986: 51).  In the words of Barrows
and Roth, “registration is best viewed as a
policy to assist in the evolution of land tenure
institutions under way ...” (Barrows and Roth,
1989: 24).
As hinted at above, formal registration of
land property rights is the ultimate stage in
the evolution of land tenure systems under
conditions of land scarcity.  Deepening
individualisation takes place along two main
dimensions, namely the range of the rights
held, and the extent of autonomy afforded by
the landholder in exercising these rights.  The
range refers to the package of rights enjoyed
by the landholder, including rights of use and
rights of transfer.  Typically, rights over a given
piece of land begin to be asserted by being
able to freely choose which crop to grow, to
freely dispose of the harvest output, and to
prevent others from exploiting the same parcel
(e.g., by grazing their livestock).  Individuali-
sation makes its way through the gradual
extension of use rights (for example, the right
to recultivate the same plot of land even before
the normal period of fallow has elapsed, or
the right to plant trees and to bring other
improvements to the land, are increasingly
recognized) and, above all, through the
addition of transfer rights.  In an ascending
order of hierarchical importance, the latter
comprise the right to lend the land along
traditional lines (that is, as part and parcel of
a wider relationship of reciprocal exchange
between two families and lineages), the right
to give it, to bequeath it, to rent it out (against
cash payments) and, eventually, to sell it.      
Individualisation of land tenure is also
reflected in the growing autonomy enjoyed
by farmers regarding their decisions of use
and, particularly, regarding their decisions to
transfer land.  Thus, in the initial stages of
individualisation, the rights to rent out or to
sell land parcels are seriously circumscribed
by the requirement that land ought to remain
within the family or the lineage.  It is the
responsibility of the lineage heads to see to it
that this condition is duly abided by and this
is why their permission is explicitly requires
before any sale of land can take place.  Such
condition is however gradually relaxed as land
becomes more scarce.
The expected benefits of land titling
Two types of beneficial economic effects are
expected to follow from the establishment of
duly recorded private property rights in land:
allocative effects resulting in more efficient
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(Green, 1987: 20-22; Haugerud, 1989: 62-
90; Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994: 11-12;
Migot-Adholla et al., 1991: 165-66; Migot-
Adholla et al., 1994b: 135-38).  Thus, for
example, on the basis of a comparison with
the Kilimanjaro region in Tanzania, Pinckney
and Kimuyu (1994 : 12) concluded that :
“With increased individualisation of land
rights under the indigenous systems between
the 1920s and the 1960s, it is likely that our
sample of Kenyan farmers would have
invested rapidly in coffee during the 1960s
even if the land titling had not taken place”.
Technically speaking, the most satisfactory
test of the impact of land titling in Kenya is
that carried out by Carter, Wiebe and Blarel
(1994) on the basis of a cross-sectional farm-
level data set from the highly commercialized
Njoro area (in the Rift Valley). This study is
particularly reliable because it avoids the
causality problem of inferring from the
existence of a significant relationship between
titling and agricultural investment that
causality runs from registration to enhanced
investment.  When title acquisition and title
maintenance involve real expenditures, it is
indeed a priori possible that farmers tend to
register land parcels that benefit from
comparatively high levels of investment, or
that registered farms are those which have
better profitability conditions justifying such
expenditures.  In this case, registration does
not stimulate investment but is positively
related to it (Roth et al., 1994a: 194).  In the
words of Carter and associates:
“…when title acquisition is costly,
identification and measurement of the
effects of tenure reform are complicated
because the best-endowed farmers, most
likely to benefit from enhanced tenure
security, are also most likely to seek title to
their land.  Farmers less favourably
endowed, are in turn, less likely to acquire
title.  Simple comparison of the perform-
ance of observed title and untitled farms
thus tends to overstate both the realized
effects of title on farmers who have
obtained it and the potential effects of title
on those who have not” (Carter et al.,
1994 : 165).
The study by Carter et al. circumvents the
above identification problem by carefully
separating the effect of land title per se from
the characteristics of the farms and farmers
observed to have more legally secure tenure
arrangements.  More precisely, it estimates
the impact not only of titles but also of other
factors such as the farm’s market access
(measured by the size of the farm itself
negatively associated with the shadow price
of capital) that affect the economic value and
likelihood of investment.  What the authors
show is that in Kenya title status is
systematically related to farm size and mode
of access to land to the point that true title
effects vanish once these mediating factors are
duly taken into account.  Moreover, with the
help of an ingenious econometric test, the
authors have been able to disentangle security-
induced demand effects from credit supply
effects of land title.  Their analysis provides
no confirmation of the existence of the former
type of effects (the ‘assurance effect’).
Considering countries where titling is
optional rather than compulsory does not
basically alter the above conclusion.  In the
Shebelle region of Somalia, the effects of land
title on various types of agricultural invest-
ment have all been found to be insignificantly
different from zero: “a comparison of
smallholder untitled and titled farms showed
little difference in investment in equipment,
fencing, drainage, bunding, irrigation pumps,
or wells, and the overall level of investment
was extremely low” (Roth et al., 1994b: 224-
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Farmers are not only more willing but also
more able to invest because, when freehold
titles are established, land acquires collateral
value and access to credit is therefore easier.
This is especially true regarding formal
lending sources which often have imperfect
information on the borrower.  The
‘collateralisation effect’ nevertheless remains
important in so far as informal credit
obtainable from informal lenders without
using land as collateral is typically less
advantageous than formal credit (Feder and
Nishio, 1997: 5).  In fact, the emergence of a
class of professional moneylenders in the
countryside –and the concomitant emergence
of a class of landless people– is seen as the
natural outcome of both the reduction of the
lender’s risk and the possibility of foreclosure
in case of default (Hicks, 1969: 107).  
As pointed out by Besley, the key
assumption to make this argument valid is
that better land rights lower foreclosure costs.
Note also that this ‘ability to invest’ effect can
be framed as an incentive effect as well.  As a
matter of fact, more individualistic land rights
resulting in improved collateral options may
be expected to reduce the equilibrium interest
rate, and since the interest rate is set equal to
the marginal productivity of capital invested
in land, investment is stimulated (Besley,
1995c: 909-10).  More importantly, the
increase in the farm’s collateral value is likely
to increase the amount it can borrow (perhaps
from zero to some positive value).  Either
change in the conditions of credit supply will
reduce the farmer’s shadow price of capital
(Carter et al., 1994: 155-56).
If we except gifts (including inheritance),
land may thus change hands in two main
ways: through foreclosure or through
voluntary market transactions. In both cases,
greater economic efficiency is the expected
outcome, whether in static or dynamic terms2.
An empirical appraisal of the
standard view
Two central arguments in the above-presented
property rights doctrine are the following :
formal property rights in land are ultimately
necessary (i) to afford the kind of security
which all farmers need to carry out long-term
investments whether for the purpose of
improving or conserving the land (lenders
also need that security in order to insure
themselves against the risk of default); and
(ii) to activate the land market so as to allow
a more efficient allocation of that scarce factor
among competing owners.  The aim of this
section is to assess the validity of these
arguments in the light of the available
empirical literature (for more details, see
Platteau, 2000 : chap. 4). 
Land titling does not enhance investment and
use of credit
The empirical evidence on the relationship
between land rights and investment or land
yields in African agriculture is so far largely
inconclusive.  This holds especially true when
the incidence of investment is compared
between lands protected by a formal title and
non-registered lands.  In empirical studies,
Kenya is a reference country because it is one
of the few African countries where a
programme of individualized titling has been
systematically applied to rural lands for several
decades (since the fifties).  Interestingly, the
evidence available so far does not show that
agricultural investment and land yields have
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2. Beyond the above efficiency effects, land titling has the additional advantage of providing the government with
a precious tool for assessing property taxes and thereby increase its revenue.for Brazil ; Moor, 1996, for Zimbabwe;
Friedman et al., 1988, for the Philippines).
Yet, even that more qualified statement
must be taken cautiously since the
aforementioned study of Thailand by Feder
et al., which did not find evidence of an
assurance effect, was carried out in a
resettlement area.  The point is that, even in
frontier or new colonisation areas (such as the
Ghibe valley in Ethiopia), effective
communities may be formed under the
decentralised initiative of the migrant settlers
themselves.  These communities lay down and
enforce rules that enable them to expel
farmers who do not abide by the established
code of conduct regarding land rights and
other essential matters.  In general, the local
informal order embedded in the rural
community guarantees basic land rights to all
villagers (including migrants) and these are
sufficient to induce investment.  There is then
no need for the state to intervene through
centralized procedures aimed at formalizing
land rights (Atwood, 1990; Migot-Adholla et
al., 1991; Platteau, 1992, 1996c, 1997;
Bassett and Crummey, 1993; Bruce and
Migot-Adholla, 1994).  If, for one reason or
another, the village informal order is absent,
has vanished, or is proving unable to regulate
access to land, however, the state may be well-
advised to substitute for the missing social
structure.
It has been pointed out above that, when
it exists, the positive influence of land titling
on investment behaviour is generally
channelled through the credit supply or
collateralisation effect.  Yet, as has also been
documented, this effect is far from being
systematically present : use of production
credit by farmers may remain low in spite of
the emergence of mortgageable land.
The prediction according to which
organised credit sources will spontaneously
arise in response to land registration to meet
the latent demand of credit-rationed farmers
is much too simplistic.  Low credit use may
actually be caused by two distinct types of
factors.  On the one hand, it may result from
supply failures that have their origin in various
imperfections not only in the credit market
itself but also in other rural factor markets,
particularly the land market.  On the other
hand, it may be determined by demand
failures that prevent farmers from tapping
available credit sources.  Let us consider these
two sets of factors in more detail, starting with
demand failures.
Smallholders may fail to apply for loans
because they perceive a high risk of losing
their land through foreclosure, as the
experience of Kenya testifies (Green, 1987: 8;
Shipton, 1988: 106, 120; Barrows and Roth,
1989: 9).  This may be especially true of
subsistence-constrained farmers who fear
their ability to repay loans taken for
investment purposes is very low (unless
payoffs are short-term).  Perceptions of risk of
default and aversion for land mortgage may
actually vary depending not only on
economic position but also on other
characteristics such as age of the landholder.
In Kenya, for example, it is mainly elders who
reject the idea of land mortgage while younger
men may be more attracted by the prospect
of ready cash and, as a result, they are more
liable to have their lands foreclosed (Shipton,
1988: 106, 120).  Unfortunately, the latter
do not necessarily use credit for productive or
investment purposes.  ‘Urgent’ consumption
needs which elders may well regard as luxury
can easily drive young people straight into
landlessness, whether inadvertently or not.
Interestingly, to reduce intra-family conflicts
around land mortgages, public authorities in
Kenya have required the agreement of family
members prior to any use of land as collateral
by the title-holder.
Another important reason behind the
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25).  Another study on Uganda reached a
somewhat more ambiguous conclusion,
however: registration here appears as
significantly and positively related to invest-
ments in fencing, continuous manuring and
mulching, and positively but insignificantly
related to all remaining long-term invest-
ments.  Also, effects on investment tend to be
more positive when registration is voluntary
than when it is imposed by the government
(Roth et al., 1994a: 193).
In Zimbabwe, smallholders –without
having private title to their land–have
achieved rapidly increasing maize yields, and
their productive performance is not inferior
to that of the biggest commercial farmers
(Harrison, 1992: 131).  Another study by
Moor (1996) in the same country has however
shown that tenure security has had a
significant and positive effect on long-term
on-farm investments.  (The impact on credit
could not be assessed given the low incidence
of credit use in the sample area).  Yet, the
sample area was peculiar in so far as it was
used for resettlement, implying that no
customary tenure system existed before the
granting of land titles. 
At this stage, it is useful to pause for a
moment and to look at the evidence available
for some Asian and Latin American countries.
In their pioneer study of Thailand, where
comparison of investment behaviour was
effected between farmers possessing legal land
titles and squatters with no such document,
Feder and associates came to the important
conclusion that most of the impact of title
ownership “stemmed from the fact that titles
increased farmers’ access to formal credit,
rather than from the elimination of actual risk
to the land rights of the farmers” (Feder and
Feeny, 1991: 145).  Where no organised credit
sources existed, legal titling did not make
much change.  In the same vein, a study
conducted in the state of Andra-Pradesh
(India) by Pender and Kerr (1994) has reached
the conclusion that land rights status as
measured by its transferability has had little
effect on investment and credit, presumably
because of the scarcity of formal credit sources
in the survey areas.
In another study devoted to rural
Paraguay, Carter et al. (1997) have estimated
the impact of titling on investment and
productivity in a way that differentiates
according to the wealth level of farmers.  The
results obtained by them are much less
encouraging than those of Feder and his co-
authors.  Indeed, what the former authors
show is that, due to a wealth bias in the credit
market, small farmers below a certain wealth
threshold do not improve their effective access
to credit following land titling.  Unfortu-
nately, this threshold is such that a large
majority of households do not actually come
close to it.  For all these credit-constrained
households, titling enhances the demand for
investment in capital goods attached to land,
yet binding liquidity constraints prevent them
from increasing the total level of investment
(so that there is substitution of attached for
unattached capital).
From the analysis of regions where land
titling exist, there is thus converging evidence
that the assurance (or the induced-security
demand) effect does not operate under
ordinary circumstances.  As we have seen
above, the experience of Kenya actually
suggests the same conclusion.  The point can
be made, however, that in the particular case
of resettlement or new colonisation areas (and
in urban or peri-urban areas), where risk and
asymmetric information with respect to land
rights are especially high, the granting of titles
is likely to increase the assurance that the
returns of an investment will accrue to those
who make it and thereby to promote land
improvement and conservation (see, e.g.,
Feder and Feeny, 1991 ; Alston et al., 1996,
62 Jean-Philippe Platteauas we find them in SubSaharan Africa –, in
blocking the normal functioning of the legal
system.  Costs of foreclosure may then 
remain high.  Thus, in Kenya again, lending
authorities have had great difficulty
foreclosing on land mortgages chiefly because
“the presence of many kin around mortgaged
land makes it politically unfeasible to auction
the holdings of defaulters” (Shipton, 1988:
120). In urban peripheries, notes another
study, “although some banks have accepted
titled land as collateral and auctioned it off in
cases of default, in some cases purchasers were
not able to take occupation of the land for
fear of reprisals” (Migot-Adholla et al., 1991:
170).
Governments may not want to run
counter to popular demonstrations of this
kind lest their political basis or the fragile
consensus on which their national policies
rest should be undermined.  In the case of
Kenya’s White Highlands repeopled with
native farmers after the departure and
compensation of European colonists (the land
settlement schemes referred to above), the
government was eventually compelled to
restrain the use of land as collateral.  The fact
of the matter is that: “The cry of land hunger
had fed the nationalist rebellion that had
brought the government to power.  To turn
people off the lands that they had fought to
capture would be to risk the wrath of the true
believers in the nationalist revolution” (Bates,
1989: 74).  The pressure on the government
was all the stronger as the official opposition
represented by a radical party (the KADU or
Kenya African Democratic Union) lobbied
intensively on the land issue (ibidem: 67-68).
In the above, it has been assumed that the
land registration system itself works properly
and that difficulties arise downstream from
the central recording process.  In fact, in-
effective operation of this system resulting in
the invalidity of the title documents may well
prevent any reduction of uncertainty and
lowering of foreclosure costs.  As has been
emphasized with reference to several Asian
countries by Feeny (1988) and to India by
Wadhwa (1989), a major problem with
cadastral surveys is that they are often
incomplete and there is a lack of diligent
record keeping of all intervening changes in
land ownership.  In the words of David Feeny,
in virtually all sampled countries “the legal
provisions ‘exceeded’ administrative practice
in the degree of sophistication and precision
of the land rights ... the transaction cost of
establishing and operating the [registration]
systems were considerable and much higher
than the costs of enacting the enabling
legislation” (Feeny, 1988: 295).  The difficul-
ties are obviously compounded when land-
holdings comprise numerous parcels which
are often minuscule.
In SubSaharan Africa, where administra-
tive capabilities are much less developed than
in Asia, the problem is bound to be all the
more serious, not a minor consideration when
it is borne in mind that high costs are
associated with registering land (site visits,
land surveys, maps, registration proper,...).
This is amply confirmed by available
evidence.  Even in a country like Senegal
where land registration has been allowed, on
a voluntary basis, only during a limited period
of time and demanded by relatively few
people, we are told that “the Senegalese
bureaucracy is still processing registration
claims that were filed in the two-year grace
period granted by the 1964 National Domain
Law” (Golan, 1990 : 51).  In Kenya and
Uganda, successions and other transfers of
title have gone largely unregistered, as a result
of which land records hardly reflect the
present day reality, thus destroying the utility
of the record and possibly engendering new
uncertainties (Doornbos, 1975: 68; Bruce,
1986: 58; Saul, 1988: 273; LTC, 1990: 4).
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farmers’ failure to respond to the availability
of loanable funds is the lack of attractive
investment opportunities or the absence of
conditions critical for their successful
exploitation.  This typically occurs when no
technological package suitable for intensive
agriculture is on offer, such as is often the case
under rainfed farming conditions ; or when
investments embodying technical progress are
highly labour-intensive (e.g., fencing, digging
of furrows and ditches, tree planting, building
of anti-erosion barriers, etc) and family labour
is sufficient to supply the required effort (so
that no capital is needed for  the purpose of
advancing wages); when the required infra-
structure, input-delivery, output-marketing
or extension services are not available ; when
visible wealth is being arbitrarily taxed (a risk
to which agricultural investments are
particularly vulnerable). 
Failures to supply credit in spite of titling
may arise from different sources.  Clearly, they
may result from imperfections in the land
market that tend to make registration
ineffective.  This obviously happens if titled
land is not considered a reliable collateral by
credit-givers because it is difficult to foreclose
or because, the market being thin, it is not
easy to dispose of in case of default (Okoth-
Ogendo, 1976: 175; Collier, 1983: 163-164;
Noronha, 1985: 197-198; Bruce, 1986: 40;
Barrows and Roth, 1989: 9). 
Difficulties in foreclosing land (or other
immovables) may originate in either the
official or the civilian sphere, or in both.  The
first case occurs when the judicial system is
ineffective or partial. This is a widespread
phenomenon in SubSaharan Africa, particu-
larly in urban and peri-urban areas where
official titles are generally granted to private
owners of land and buildings. In actual fact, a
complaint frequently voiced by institutional
credit-givers – not only state finance
corporations but also commercial banks and
other private credit agencies– is precisely that
foreclosure on property belonging to rich and
powerful borrowers cannot be legally enforced
because the judicial system is under the strong
influence of their political allies.  In Kenya
where influential people in government and
politics bought larger plots (so-called Z-plots)
under the land settlement schemes, we learn
that : “By mid-1969 no cases of chronic loan
defaulters from Z-plot holders had yet been
referred to the Attorney General, although by
the end of 1969, 158 recommendations for
eviction of other settlers had gone to the
Sifting Committee in Parliament with 84
evictions resulting” (Wasserman, 1976 : 155-
156 – quoted from Van de Laar, 1980: 173).
Clearly, perverse equity effects result from the
operation of a land market (with free
mortgage) when it is combined with a biased
legal system.
If anything, the situation has worsened in
Kenya.  Corruption is so widespread in the
legal and judicial systems that registration
does not offer serious protection to title-
holders and that banks have nowadays
stopped accepting land titles as collaterals.
Testimonies abound to show that the power
of money exceeds that of legality to vindicate
claims to land.  In other words, to protect
access rights against deceitful claimants, the
possession of a title is not sufficient: too often,
it is the amount of the bribes offered to the
judge which will decide which party is going
to win the case irrespective of any legal
supporting evidence (personal field observa-
tions).
Popular expression of anger and active
opposition can also ‘break the transmission’
between registration and credit supply.  This
happens because, when people do not
consider the new system of (land) rights as
legitimate and do not accept the reshuffling
of wealth it may imply, they may succeed, –
especially in young nations with ‘soft’ states
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The process of adjudication and registration
of full-fledged private property rights in land
is susceptible of increasing insecurity for
vulnerable categories of the population.
Two sources of increased uncertainty
deserve special mention : the loss of derived
rights at the expense of vulnerable categories,
and the unfair assignment of rights to the
powerful.
Loss of derived or secondary rights 
The idea that land registration is grounded in
an adjudication procedure that does nothing
else than recognise and record accurately
existing land rights is far too simplistic.  In
effect, if titling may reduce risk and
transaction costs for some categories of
people, it may simultaneously create new
uncertainties for other categories which rely
on customary or informal practices and rules
to establish and safeguard their land claims
(Atwood, 1990: 663-64).  In other words, as
the experience of Kenya reveals, sections of
local populations face a serious risk of being
denied legal recognition of their customary
rights to land during the registration process
(Green, 1987: 6, 22-23).  This is especially
true of women, pastoralists, hunter-gatherers,
casted people, former slaves and serfs, people
belonging to minority tribes, etc., who have
traditionally enjoyed subsidiary or derived
(usufruct) rights to land.  As noted by Green,
increased security for the registered owner –
usually the male head of household – “may
mean greater insecurity for other users, who
may after the reform use the land only at the
sufferance of the owner” (ibidem: 26; see also
Coldham, 1978; Bruce, 1986: 54; Bruce and
Fortmann, 1989: 7; Mackenzie, 1993: 208-
13).
Ultimately, if an equity problem arises, it
is because traditional tenure rules and rights
which determine access to land (and water
points) in such a way as to assure employment
for the able and social security for the poor,
the old and the disabled defy recording and
classification.  Put in another way, it is
impossible to bring to the adjudication
register all the multiple rights claimable under
customary law (Barrows and Roth, 1989: 8).
Given that the complex bundles of rights
associated with given parcels are extremely
hard to sort out (where one person’s bundle
of tenurial rights stops and where another’s
begins is often very difficult to determine)
and that a landholding unit (such as the
‘compound’ in West African societies) is rarely
under a single management rule (if only
because women manage ‘their’ fields fairly
independently), the cost entailed by a
comprehensive registration would be prohibi-
tively high, all the higher as the bureaucratic
machinery is confronted by a considerable
information gap.  Such a machinery has
indeed much less information and knowledge
of land tenure history of rural communities
than these communities themselves (Riddell
et al. , 1987: 30-31).
In fact, when customary group rights and
community control are extinguished by a
procedure of registration/titling, there is a
transfer of transaction costs from local land
authorities to the state and it is the inability
of the state to bear them that explains the
failure to adjudicate and register all rights
existing under the customary system (Barrows
and Roth, 1989: 21).  It must also be added
that traditional systems of land tenure involve
a great deal of flexibility and recording all the
adjustments implied would prove extremely
difficult.
Unfair assignment of rights to the powerful
In a social context dominated by huge
differences in education levels and by
differential access to the state administration,
there is much to be feared that the adjudi-
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In the case of Kenya, Green does not
hesitate to say that failure to maintain a valid
record of successions and absence of updated
records constitute one of the major dis-
appointments of the land titling program
(Green, 1987: 11).  As for Shipton, he writes:
“So the emergent land market is largely
unregistered. It is likely to remain so. The
government does not have the resources to
monitor, let alone control, the many kinds of
land exchanges that happen every season in
the farm neighborhoods. By their very nature,
these defy recording and classification: for the
most part they are ad hoc, unnamed,
individually tailored agreements in which
land is only one of many mutually inter-
changeable goods;... the lines blur between
loans, rentals, barter, swaps, and sales”
(Shipton, 1988: 123). 
To sum up, as a result of glaring failure to
build up and update reliable land records,
titles shown on the register are increasingly at
variance with the facts of possession and use
and considerable confusion is created over
legal property rights. The impact of land
registration is therefore undermined and,
since credit agencies are not able to rely on
titles as evidence of land ownership, the
collateral effect fails to materialise.  In
Zambia, it is the very process of issuing titles
that is disturbed by interventions from
customary authorities.  Thus, for example,
the District Council in Mazabuka upholds
traditional norms of prohibition “by refusing
to relay title applications to the Lands
Ministry in Lusaka, although they had no
authority to withold them ; applications
would only be accepted for small, fenced-in
tree gardens around the dwelling, not for
agricultural fields” (Sjaastad, 1998 : 250).
Besides difficulties in repossessing land
collaterals and realising them in the market
(or in getting titles issued), there are supply
constraints arising from the strategy of credit-
givers.  First, commercial banks and financial
institutions are often reluctant to lend for land
purchases because they are unwilling to tie up
their capital, raised largely through short-term
deposits, for long periods of time (Dorner
and Saliba, 1981; Stringer, 1989).  Moreover,
bankers usually prefer lending against more
reliable streams of income than those found
in agriculture.  Second, considerations of
administrative costs may lead banks and other
credit agencies to set a minimum size of loans
which often exceeds the capital needs of
smallholders (Barrows and Roth, 1989: 9), or
to refuse to lend to them on the ground that
their property is costly to dispose of in the
event of foreclosure due to the tiny size of
fragmented landholdings.  Following titling,
distribution of credit is thus likely to become
more unequal and this is bound to affect farm
income distribution.
The above analysis, it must be noted,
suggests policy implications which widely
differ from those usually associated with the
standard economic theory of property rights.
As a matter of fact, to the extent that land
titling affects investment behaviour only
through the credit-supply effect, it may be
better to address the collateral problem
directly (perhaps through the formation of
informal co-operative borrowing groups)
than to resolve it through expensive titling
programs (Carter et al., 1994: 156).  To avoid
setting off unequalising processes, special
attention ought to be lent to market access
problems, particularly with respect to capital,
that tend to hit smallholders who constitute
the bulk of the farming population.  On the
other hand, if lack of credit use in agriculture
also comes from the demand side as a result
of various market and state failures, the most
sensible thing to do for a government is to try
to remove non-tenurial constraints with a
view to freeing this demand (André and
Platteau, 1998).
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181-84).
As for allocation of public lands, there are
plenty of accounts showing that it is often
politically manipulated.  In Nigeria, just to
take one example, under the cover of national
development projects extensive land tracts
“running to hundreds of hectares” have been
granted (on a long-term basis) to ‘political
friends’ even though this led to the dis-
possession of many villagers of their
customary lands (Zubair, 1987: 133 ; see also
Mugangu Matabaro, 1997, for Congo ex-
Zaïre).
Given the high level of politicisation of
wealth allocation in SubSaharan Africa and
the highly unequal chances of getting access
to strategic information or influencing
bureaucratic and judiciary decision-making
(see, for example, Sklar, 1979; Hyden, 1983;
Berry, 1984; Young, 1986; Bayart, 1989),
registration can therefore be said to supply a
mechanism for transfer of wealth in favour of
the educational, economic and political elite
(Barrows and Roth, 1989: 8).   Insofar as it
encourages the assertion of greedy interests
with powerful backing and is likely, wittingly
or not, to reward cunning, titling opens up
new possibilities of conflict and insecurity.
This evolution can have disastrous con-
sequences for vulnerable sections of the
population if loss of land is followed by
outright eviction.
A final remark is in order.  If titling is not
(fully) subsidised and a price is charged on
landholders, the strategies of powerful
individuals is all the more threatening as lack
of access to credit and low wealth levels
prevent smallholders from registering their
land.  Price of registration thus acting as an
important rationing mechanism, small-
holders are highly vulnerable to attempts by
the elites to grab their (untitled) lands while,
on the contrary, the latter can immediately
protect their own.  In other words, titling
increases tenure insecurity of the poor because
it places a formidable weapon in the hands of
the rich who have both better ability to pay
the price of registration and superior
knowledge of government bureaucracy and
procedures (see, e.g., Roth, 1993: 318-19).
Land titling is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for land market activation
Registration of land rights turns out to be
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for land market activation.  Let us begin by
considering the second proposition before
turning to the first one.
Titling is not a sufficient condition for land
market activation
The main evidence here again comes from
Kenya.  As a matter of fact, it appears that,
contrary to expectations, land sale trans-
actions have not increased following the
implementation of the titling program.
Activation of the land market just occurred
during the earliest stages of the reform
because, in the knowledge of pending
registration, the educated elite took advantage
of the situation to acquire additional lands.
Except for that peculiar set of circumstances,
the majority of parcels, when they are
transferred, continue to follow the path of
customary channels (lending, gifts, inheri-
tance or non-registered sales) among which
inheritance stands foremost (Haugerud,
1983: 80; Collier, 1983: 156-58; Bruce,
1986: 56; Green, 1987: 13-18; Barrows and
Roth, 1989: 10-11; Migot-Adholla et al.,
1991: 160-164; Mackenzie, 1993: 200).
Supply considerations largely explain why
land sale markets are thin in SubSaharan
Africa, even in countries where land titles have
been issued.  Landholders are typically reluc-
tant to sell their land, even when they get an
employment outside the agricultural sector
Allocating and enforcing property rights in land 69
cation/registration process will be manipu-
lated by the elite in its favour.  If the experience
of Thailand can serve as any guide, then it
indicates that such a fear is well justified: land
records have been manipulated by powerful
government officials so as to allow elites
(individuals, families, or private companies)
with a high level of political connections “to
obtain ownership of land that, under the
traditional system, would have been
controlled by homesteading cultivators”.
Original occupants (especially when they
belong to non-Thai minorities) found it
difficult to protect their customary rights
owing to “differential access of claimants in
land disputes to the Thai bureaucracy”
(Thomson et al., 1986: 413-14; see also Feeny,
1988: 286-287, 294-96).  The same kind of
difficulties, and the consequent fear of land
registration on the part of dominated sections
of the population, have been documented
with respect to other Asian countries (see,
e.g., Wadhwa, 1989; Viswanath, 1997, for
India), and to Latin America and the
Caribbean as well (Stanfield, 1990).
The situation is not different in
SubSaharan Africa.  During the colonial
period already, in countries where lands could
be immatriculated (such as those under
French colonial rule), numerous malpractices
have been observed which allowed powerful
people (including bureaucrats, particularly
land surveyors who are “prominent experts in
land grabbing”) to dominate land allocation
procedures, especially inside or near urban
areas.  As for rural lands, the few people who
took advantage of the registration system had
often manipulated the law to expropriate
collective rights for themselves (Bayart, 1989:
113; Golan, 1990: 19; Haugerud, 1983: 78;
Mackenzie, 1993: 212).  The case of Uganda
where chiefs used (voluntary) land titling
reform to snatch land (including communal
grazing areas) away from the poor is well-
known (Doornbos, 1975; Noronha, 1985;
see also Firmin-Sellers, 1996, for Ghana). 
Contemporary evidence points in the
same direction, as can be judged from the
experience of the few countries where a land
titling programme has been implemented ; or
from that of the numerous countries where
registration of rural lands has been allowed
during a transitory period accompanying a
reform vesting bare ownership of all non-
immatriculated lands in the state ; or, again,
from the experience of countries where public
lands form an important category in national
land laws.  In the first two cases, the experience
is similar: clever, well-informed or powerful
(and usually educated) individuals often
successfully jockey to have parcels not
previously theirs registered in their own name
while the mass of rural people are generally
unaware of the new land provisions or do not
grasp the implications of registration.  An
extreme, almost caricatural illustration is
provided by these few well-connected
Kenyans who succeeded in having pasture
lands registered in their own names on the
ground that they would bring them into
cultivation.  In fact, as the experience soon
revealed, their intent was not to exploit the
land in question but just to use it as collateral
in order to obtain loans from banks in
Nairobi.  Proceeds of these loans were used to
finance children’s university studies abroad
and the plan was to shun repayment and let
the land be foreclosed (personal communi-
cation of Okoth-Ogendo).
In Mauritania, good irrigated lands
traditionally claimed by local Negro-African
communities on the right bank of the Senegal
river have been adjudicated to private owners
with a view to encouraging their efficient
exploitation.  Yet, as things turned out, these
lands were allotted to people of Moorish
origin by an essentially Moorish administra-
tion and many of them were not actually
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registration of land has not led to a reduction
of land disputes but, if anything, to their
exacerbation. Consequently, public authori-
ties are well-advised to rely on decentralized,
customary mechanisms of intra-family
negotiation and dispute settlement.
Economic considerations are not the only
rationale for keeping family land.  Other,
more symbolic motives that belong to a
traditional realm of values also seem to play a
role.  In tribal societies, indeed, the collective
identity of a people is narrowly tied with the
ancestral land.  Since its value is embedded in
the social structure and history of a particular
community (Riddell et al., 1987: 82-83), 
land represents far more than a mere input
into an agricultural enterprise and it is
impossible to abstract it from all the social,
ritual, affective and political meanings
associated with it.  People continue to strongly
adhere to the traditional ethical principle that
land ought to belong to the ‘sons of the
village’, to the members of the local
community (most commonly defined by
descent or adoption) whose families have been
living on the land for several generations and
have therefore developed ritualistic and
strongly emotional identity links with it.  This
is all the more so as the ancestors’ cult is still
very much alive (ancestors are actually
believed to continuously intervene in present-
day human affairs) and is deeply rooted in
the (corporate) land of the lineage  (Caldwell
and Caldwell, 1987: 415-17).
Reluctance to part with ancestral land is
especially strong when it threatens to go to
outsiders.  Already during the colonial period,
indigenous people felt it a sacred duty to
protect family or clan property and to prevent
ancestral land from passing into European
hands3.  Nowadays, the same attitude can still
be largely observed and, as expected, the land
market is more severely restricted where
kinship ties are strongest, for example, more
restricted in Kenya’s former African reserve
(where it operates mainly among members of
the same ethnic group) than in the former
white settled areas and in urban peripheries
(Migot-Adholla et al. , 1991: 169 ; Pinckney
and Kimuyu, 1994: 15). What Zufferey has
noted with reference to Botswana (Eastern
Central District) still applies to many
countries in SubSaharan Africa : “Owning
land thus appears to confer to the local
residents a sense of identity and membership
in a specific social group in comparison with
thebahaladi (foreigners) who are, in contrast,
expected to apply for land” (Zufferey, 1986:
79).
Titling is not a necessary condition for land
market activation
Under conditions of acute land scarcity,
unmitigated by a sufficiently rapid develop-
ment of land-saving technical innovations
and new income-earning opportunities
outside the agricultural sector, land sale
transactions tend to multiply even when they
are illegal and the land is not titled. This is
all the more likely to happen if the customary
order and its social security mechanisms are
weak or have eroded under the pressure of
individualistic tendencies encouraged by
market development (including the
individualisation of land tenure itself)
(Baland and Platteau, 1996: 279-83).
Desperation sales are then the mechanism
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and they reside in town.  Land continues to
be perceived as a crucial asset for the present
and/or future subsistence of the family, all the
more so as it is a secure form of holding wealth
and a good hedge against inflation (“It is our
bank and we will not part with it”, said the
member of a founding lineage in a village close
to Matam, Senegal).  That considerations of
social insurance determine attitudes of deep
attachment to land is understandable in a
context of scarce alternative employment
opportunities and risky labour markets.  For
many people working in urban areas, indeed,
land serves both as an insurance against
uncertain employment and against landless-
ness in the next generation of the family, and
as a pension fund for their old days (Bruce,
1986: 56; Green, 1987: 27; Lawry, 1993: 
58).
Such social security considerations often
underlie the apparent persistence of indige-
nous control over land transfers even when
they are duly registered: thus, in Kenya, many
owners of titled lands do not consider that
they are entitled to transfer their lands outside
the lineage or to make permanent transfers
without having previously obtained the
approval of their family or community.  This
is not always the case, however.  It has thus
happened (in Kenya) that “young, un-
employed men sold land registered in their
name, leaving their parents destitute” (Green,
1987 : 7), and that “poor peasants, given title
to their land, promptly sold it, spent the cash
and were soon left landless and cashless to”
(The Economist, 21–27 January, 1995 : 49).  
It is precisely to prevent such decisions
being made without sufficient consideration
for their future consequences (that is, to
prevent myopic behaviour on the part of
thoughtless rightsholders) or for their
immediate consequences for other family
members (that is, to force selfish rightsholders
to take account of externalities) that rural
communities or family units require to be
consulted beforehand.  Such interference with
the free play of market forces is justified in so
far as these communities are ultimately
responsible for the subsistence of their
individual members, and will therefore be
called upon to assist any member who has
become destitute out of bad luck or wanton
behaviour.
In the case of Kenya, this situation of a
constrained land market is reinforced by the
fact that District Land Control Boards in
charge of approving land sales are frequently
reluctant to permit transactions which would
leave families (and their descendants) landless
and destitute.  That is why they insist that all
adult members of the household (including
women) of the title-holder are to be present
at the hearing to indicate their agreement with
the sale. The government has actually
sanctioned this de facto situation since a
presidential directive aimed at minimizing
land disputes requires the agreement of family
members in addition to that of the title-holder
prior to any sale or use of land as collateral
(Haugerud, 1983 : 84; Mackenzie, 1993 :
200; Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994 : 10).
In Zimbabwe, likewise, a proposal by a
land tenure commission appointed by the
government (October 1994) provides that
individual farmers should be given the right
to own their land, but their right to buy and
sell it should be subject to the approval of the
traditional village council (the sabuku) which
in pre-colonial days used to be vested with
the prerogative of allocating local lands (The
Economist, 21–27 January 1995 : 49).
There is a remarkable lesson to draw from
the above : it is under the pressing need to
prevent land disputes and family conflicts
from multiplying too rapidly that the state
has decided to retreat from the most radical
interpretation of freehold tenure and to revert
to some customary principles of land
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3. Thus in Nigeria, 1922-23, the Egba asked through their chief that they be allowed by the British to mortgage
their urban lands to foreign companies so as to be able to raise money from local European banks.  Yet they
were keen that such principle is not extended to rural lands because they felt it a sacred duty not to take any
risk that their ancestral property will be lost to foreigners (Meek, 1949 : 266-67).matters are de facto rather than de jure rights.
In Kenya, exercising prerogatives formally
attached to full-fledged private property
rights guaranteed by legal titles would
contravene important community norms that
are embedded in the  indigenous tenure
system.  In Rwanda and Uganda, by contrast,
relentless population pressure and an history
of much more individualised settlement
patterns making for the absence of genuine
community life have caused the land tenure
system to evolve so radically that de facto
private property rights have emerged even in
the absence of state-led registration.
Note finally that it is probably wrong to
think that the collateral effect can only occur
if the land is duly titled.  Evidence seems to
show that informal land market transactions
can be supported by written evidence
sufficiently reliable to allow the use of land as
collateral by local credit-givers.  In Rwanda,
for example, credit-cum-savings rotating
associations known as tontines are able to seize
on the land of a defaulting member (André
and Platteau, 1998).
Limitations of the informal village
order
The problem of inter-community relations
Reliance on local communities for allocating
and enforcing land rights offers significant
advantages.  First, contrary to formal proce-
dures such as land titling which are costly and
impose definitive land rights, informal
practices at village level are cheap (they
economize on information costs) and flexible.
Second, even though social differentiation is
not to be underestimated, African village
communities tend to provide social security
to all their members and to ensure that
everybody can participate in new opportu-
nities.  Such considerations of social security
and equity usually dominate pure efficiency
concerns, which should be regarded as a
positive contribution in a generally insecure
economic environment (Lawry, 1993: 73).
Third, contrary to a widespread view, infor-
mal tenure systems embedded in community
life do not necessarily hamper the develop-
ment of land markets and formal sanctioning
of land rights does not necessarily stimulate
such a development.  And, fourth, enduring
customary systems tend to receive remarkable
consensus, in particular consensus on the
normative order justifying land claims (Saul,
1993).
Rather than comprehensive land titling
programmes, what Africa seems to require is
therefore a pragmatic and gradualist approach
that reinstitutionalises indigenous land
tenure, promotes the adaptability of its
existing arrangements, avoids a regimented
tenure model, and relies as much as possible
on informal procedures at local level (Bruce,
1986: 64-68; Atwood, 1990: 667; Migot-
Adholla et al., 1991: 170-173)4.  Hence the
need to explore “community-based solutions
to tenure insecurity and a ‘state-facilitated’
evolution of indigenous land tenure systems”
(Bruce, 1993: 50-1).  In other words, since
reality shows that in SubSaharan Africa direct
state intervention in land matters is better
minimised – state intervention is indeed a
major source of farmers’ insecurity –, and that
village systems are frequently able to evolve to
meet new needs, one may conclude that
indigenous land tenure arrangements  still
have a dominant role to play.
While emphasising a crucial role for
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through which the above-discussed shortage
of voluntary supply is overcome and the land
market is activated.  A high incidence of
migratory flows is another circumstance
susceptible of activating land sale trans-
actions.
Two recent studies, one by André and
Platteau (1998) on western Rwanda and
another one by Baland, Gaspart, Place, and
Platteau (1999) on Central Uganda have thus
shown a high incidence of informal land
market transactions.  In the village studied by
the former authors, almost 30% of land
parcels owned by local inhabitants (represen-
ting about the same proportion of total land
owned) had been acquired through market
purchases.  The closure of the land frontier in
Eastern Rwanda and of migration possibilities
in both Uganda and Zaïre (causing reverse
migration movements) combined with rapid
population growth to suddenly cause an
enormous amount of land hunger that was
not counterbalanced by an expansion of non-
agricultural employment opportunities.
Increasing activity of the local land market
triggered off by rising numbers of distress sales
rapidly ensued.
As a matter of fact, the study found that,
out of 247 recorded land sales, almost two-
thirds have been motivated by the need to
finance emergency expenditures (food and
medicine), to repay debts or to meet social
exigencies.  Especially worth singling out is
the fact that in more than 30% of the cases it
is the sheer need for survival that has forced
the household to part with a fraction of its
landholding.  In addition, almost 17% of land
sales have occurred because the household
had to incur litigation expenses usually
connected with land disputes or to pay various
kinds of fees (including bribes paid to judges
with a view to influencing court decisions).
It is only in about one-third of the cases that
land sale transactions can be presumed to have
fostered efficiency: parcels were thus sold due
to bad location (usually an excessive distance
from the owner’s house), to the owner’s desire
to rationalise his property, or to reallocate his
wealth (such as when he uses the sale proceeds
to construct a new house, to finance a
migratory move or schooling expenditures,
etc).
It bears emphasis that the rapidly increasing
activity of the land market took place in spite
of its largely illegal character.  Indeed, below a
critical size of two hectares, land property is
permitted to be neither alienated nor sub-
divided or fragmented (decree n° 09/76 of
1976, March 4, art. 3 and art. 82-83).  From
evidence provided in the paper, it is evident
that all sales of land parcels are in violation of
the law: local inhabitants are too poorly
endowed in land to be allowed to part with
some of it.
One important lesson from the above
Rwandan story is that spontaneous individua-
lisation of land rights, unassisted by any
process of titling or registration at the state
level, can be extremely effective in activating
the land market even when land sales do
actually violate the law.  In this respect, it is
quite revealing that land sale transactions were
typically attested by written documents
established in the presence of witnesses,
thereby ensuring the validity of land trans-
actions.
In Uganda, informal land sales are not
illegal yet they are even more frequent than in
Rwanda.  In the area studied by Baland et al.
(1999), 47% of the total land area owned by
the sample households in 36 different villages
have been purchased, a figure which is very
close to the proportion of 45% found for the
areas of Mpigi (Central Uganda) and Kabale
(South Uganda) by Swallow et al. (1994).
Uganda is apparently the African country
with the highest rate of land market activity.
The above findings demonstrate that what
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4. Interestingly, the same conclusion was reached in a careful survey of the land situation in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Stanfield, 1990).In Western Burkina Faso, local residents fear a
flood of migrant settlers (mainly Moose) into
their ancestral lands, but, so far, thanks to the
strength of their traditional social structure
(based on agnatic lineages), they have
succeeded in effectively blocking further
settlement on their territory (Saul, 1993: 81-
2 and Laurent, 1995 ; see also Riddell et al. ,
1987 : 31 for Zaïre).
Land alienation to strangers, whether
through sale transactions or state mandatory
allocations, is not necessarily opposed by the
use of open violence.  Milder and more subtle
forms of hostility such as malpractices of
deceit, manipulations and double deals
directed against strangers are frequent
occurrences.  In Kenya, for example, “farmers
who have pledged their land titles as security
for loans are sometimes tempted into selling
their land to strangers without informing
them of the charges on the land”, which leaves
them free to default on their loans if they wish
(Shipton, 1988: 111).  Also, some farmers sell
their land to several (stranger) buyers at once
or agree to sell “in the expectation that after
they have collected their money, the sale will
be ruled void by the local land control board
and district registrar and they will succeed in
evading repayment of the money paid by the
buyer” (ibidem).
Evidently, such discriminatory postures of
indigenous communities towards strangers
entail both efficiency and equity costs.
Efficiency costs arise from all the transaction
costs and the ensuing land market imperfec-
tions that are created by distrust and opposi-
tion between indigenous and stranger
farmers.  As illustrated above, land may be
prevented from accruing to the latter, whether
through land sale, land rental, or land
adjudication processes.  To the extent that
strangers are more performing than indige-
nous members of the host communities,
efficiency losses will result.  Sometimes,
resistance against allocation of land to
strangers does not take place immediately but
only after they have demonstrated their ability
to manage land more successfully than the
original residents.  Thus, in the Zorgho region
in Burkina Faso, some areas of suitable land
were developed under the auspices of the
PDLG (Projet de Développement Local du
Ganzourgou) and granted to immigrant
farmers who were interested in irrigated
agriculture.  Indigenous farmers preferred to
continue their traditional rainfed agricultural
practices and did not show any interest in new
agricultural methods.  Yet, when the land
improvement scheme proved successful,
indigenous farmers reacted by opportunisti-
cally claiming back what they consider as their
own ‘ancestral’ lands and by demanding the
expulsion of all stranger farmers (personal
communication of Hubert Ouedraogo). 
Equity costs are the direct result of the
aforementioned fact that certain communities
may retain surplus land for themselves (say,
because they want to have reserve land
available for future generations) while farmers
from other communities may be land-hungry.
A well-functioning land rental market might,
of course, overcome such imbalances in land
endowments, at least for a certain time period.
None the less, the fear of losing ownership
rights if land is thus rented out to stranger
farmers may act as an impediment to rental
contracts.
In the above circumstances where serious
tensions develop between indigenous
communities and immigrant groups as a
result of growing actual or anticipated land
scarcity, land markets may therefore be
prevented from working in a satisfactory
manner.  Or, more exactly, land transactions
may carry low transaction costs when made
between people native of the resident
community, yet entail considerable transac-
tion costs as soon as the land deals involve
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African village communities, one should be
wary of not falling into the snare of
romanticism.   These communities are not
the kind of havens of peace and harmony that
they are sometimes portrayed to be.  Perhaps
their most serious shortcoming consists of
their parochial character which induces
chauvinistic behaviours towards outsiders
when land pressure begins to reach alarming
levels.  Here is a protective stance that
contrasts with the well-documented attitude
of openess and hospitality characterising
indigenous communities under conditions of
land abundance.  Owing to fears aroused by
impending scarcity, traditional displays of
tolerance thus give way to crude and open
manifestations of discrimination against
strangers.
Original occupants may not hesitate to
use violence to oppose the transfer of
traditional family or communal lands to
outsiders, committing acts of sabotage,
looting, burning and theft on the property
and crops of the new landholders.  An extreme
example of the excesses to which this
opposition may lead is the so-called ‘Manife-
sto of the Oppressed Negro-Mauritanian’.
Written by an extremist group belonging to
the black (haalpulaar) community of
Mauritania, it is an aggressive reaction to the
post-1983 introduction of private land rights
conferred (by adjudication) upon stranger
owners over irrigated lands located on the
right bank of the Senegal river.  In this
manifesto, the Negro-Mauritanians are
invited to use any conceivable means to
prevent their customary lands from passing
into the hands of the Beydaneelite (of Moorish
origin), that is, “to boycott, ban, kill if needed,
all those who encourage the sale of land;
destroy, burn the possessions of these strangers
who come to develop your lands while the
land should belong to our villages” (quoted
from Bayart, 1989: 82).  
Since cultivators on both sides of the river
belong to the same (haalpulaar) community5,
and since some people residing on the left
bank (that is, on the Senegalese side) used to
cultivate lands located on the right bank (that
is, on the Mauritanian side) over which they
had customary access since generations, the
transfer of lands on the right  bank to Moorish
owners was bound to create serious tensions
between the two neighbouring countries.
These tensions could not be contained and
led to a war between Senegal and Mauritania
in April 1989 (Leservoisier, 1994: Chap. 10 ;
Maiga, 1995: 54-57).
It is also worth noting that, on the left
bank, there is growing resentment and
mounting opposition against transfers of land
through ‘illegal’ sales – chiefs or other
powerful individuals sell customary land
without the consent of the community and
unduly appropriate the proceeds – to rich
purchasers.  Opposition is especially directed
at capitalists or civil servants from Dakar and
at the well-to-do Moor elite which acceded to
economic prosperity through its leadership
role in the export oilseeds boom in the Sine-
Saloum.  It is easy to multiply examples of
this kind. In the Peanut Basin itself, we learn
that every year villagers “meet to trace the
borders of the land and set the rules so that
everyone bands together to keep the land in
the village” (Golan, 1990: 15).
In Ghana, as the frontier land became
gradually exhausted, indigenous (Akan )
ideology began to reassert with vigour “the
inalienable rights of the native custodians of
the land, and the inalienable rights of
individual usufruct” (Robertson, 1987: 77).
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5. The haalpulaar (‘Toucouleur’) community is a mix of Fulani and Serere ethnies.but leaving agriculture generally as the re
maining farmers employ more labor-efficient
methods” based upon mechanization (Bruce,
1986: 54; 1988: 44).  Along the Senegal river
in Mauritania, the new Beydane owners bring
their good waalo (irrigable) lands under
intensive (rice) cultivation through a system
of owner cultivation assisted by labour-saving
mechanical devices.  Such a choice has been
apparently motivated by the desire to
overcome difficult supervisory problems in a
social context dominated by tense inter-
community relations.
When land sale transactions (or other
types of transfers) take place that run counter
to traditional social norms, it cannot be taken
for granted that the sum of transaction costs
will decrease and that efficiency will improve.
Incentive problems resulting from lack of
legitimacy of the new land arrangements may
create serious imperfections in the labour and
land rental or sale markets with the effect of
impeding the equalization of land-labour
ratios across farms that allocative efficiency
would dictate.
The way ahead
We are now able to conclude.  Rural com-
munities in SubSaharan Africa form living
systems which have at their disposal many
effective means to preempt or subvert any
change ushered in from without which they
do not like. Turning these communities
around or opposing them in land matters is
all the more difficult as tenure rights are
embedded in socio-cultural systems that are
not easily bypassed (they embody rules about
virtually all aspects of social life, such as
marriage, inheritance, homage and power,
etc.).  What is therefore needed is an approach
based on cooperation rather than confronta-
tion6. This implies, whenever feasible, a
strengthening of local capacities for
management, information, and dispute
settlement rather than imposing from above
the mechanisms of a formal state legal system
(Atwood, 1990: 667).   In most cases, it also
implies recognising the rights of original
occupants to ‘vacant’ land located in their
ancestral territories (Bassett, 1993a).  Owing
to the persisting influence of traditional
concepts of corporate land ownership and
identity, it is indeed a more effective strategy
for the state to (skilfully) negotiate acceptable
compromises with customary native
communities if the objective is to open
pockets of abundant land to stranger
cultivators or to improve village lands that are
not optimally exploited.  Such compromises
can, for example, lead indigenous
communities to rent out land to outsiders in
a peaceful atmosphere where their original
rights are not disputed or subverted by the
state.  To prevent the kind of tragic situations
mentioned above from arising, the issue of
land rights must be squarely addressed and
debated with the local community before a
development scheme involving strangers is
started.
This being said, when informal institu-
tions and practices are no more reliable
methods of adjudicating land rights and
ensuring land tenure security, African
governments may have to undertake a formal
registration procedure.  There are special
circumstances where titling may thus be
worthwhile, such as when indigenous tenure
systems are absent or very weak; or when
traditional lines of authority have been
severed and loyalties to lineage and communal
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strangers.  The above-cited study by André
and Platteau (1998) on Western Rwanda is
probably a good illustration of this possibility.
But the same cannot be said of the study on
Central Uganda (Baland et al., 1999) since
many land transactions in this area actually
enable immigrants to get access to land.  A
possible explanation for this situation is that,
in Uganda compared with Rwanda, there exist
relatively stable non-agricultural income
opportunities, especially in urban areas, that
help to alleviate land pressure and to induce a
significant number of landholders to
permanently migrate to these areas of
alternative employment.
The other side of the dilemma
To sum up, when land becomes severely scarce
and alternative income-earning opportunities
are lacking, the customary system of land
tenure, in spite of its undoubted evolutionary
qualities, cannot be expected to work
efficiently and equitably if inter-community
or interregional dimensions are taken into
account.  This said, the important point to
make is that there is no guarantee that a
centralised process of registration and
enforcement of land rights will prove more
successful.  Indeed, if the allocation of land is
not deemed fair and legitimate by the
indigenous communities, important transac-
tion costs will in any event arise that impair
the efficiency of land and other rural factor
markets.
Such costs follow from the uncertainties
created by a situation in which land rights
granted to immigrant farmers (through
formal adjudication or through state-enforced
market transactions) are likely to be seriously
disputed by a majority of local residents.
Think, for example, of all the costs which the
new, ‘illegitimate’ owners will have to bear in
order to protect the land property they have
acquired in violation of local customary
norms (perhaps as a result of land sales by a
‘corrupt’ land master or village chief).  Such
costs are of both a fixed and recurrent nature
: thus, land and related property need to be
not only enclosed and fenced but also
constantly guarded against malignant
interference.  Furthermore, mounting social
tensions in the countryside can give rise to
serious labour market imperfections that may
entail considerable efficiency costs at the level
of the whole economy.  This will happen if
landless villagers, prompted by a desire to take
revenge for the loss of their customary rights
of access, decide to harm the interests of the
new private owners, at least when these
owners are strangers.  
As wage labourers, they may be incited to
indulge in labour-shirking and mismanage-
ment of assets while, as sharecroppers, they
will pilfer inputs, underreport output and
overreport non-labour factor costs.  These
moral hazard problems can be controlled only
through continuous and tight monitoring,
thus increasing the effective cost of labour
dramatically.  To such problems, landowners
may nevertheless respond by adopting capital-
using input combinations or labour-
augmenting innovations so as to ease the
problems of controlling hired labour and to
avoid sharecropping their lands.  From a social
viewpoint, mechanization of the production
process, when it is conceived as a means of
breaking labour supervision constraints that
would not have arisen under another land
rights system, appears as unfortunate.  It
corresponds to input mixes that are ill-suited
to the factor endowments of African societies
since fixed capital in the form of sophisticated
imported machinery will cause a serious drain
on their scarce savings and foreign exchange
resources.  
In Kenya, we are thus told that most of
the new landless “do not appear to be moving
into tenant or agricultural wage-labor roles,
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6. See the fascinating study by Bassett on Northern Ivory Coast where examples of the two attitudes can actually
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groups eroded (Migot-Adholla et al. , 1991:
170).  Yet, even when uncertainties and
tensions prevail that cannot be adequately
reduced by local communities, – particularly
with respect to inter-community relations –,
or when local practices involve efficiency or
equity costs deemed excessive, the govern-
ment does not necessarily need to have
recourse to the most costly solution.  Thus,
short of registration, it could lay down a
number of basic, well-publicized principles
aimed at validating certain kinds of land
claims or transactions (Migot-Adholla et al.,
1991 : 170 ; 1994a : 114-17). 
As Martin Weitzman (1993) has pointed
out in another context, conventional
economic theory that draws on the property
rights literature may be inadequate because it
misses a critical dimension, namely the ability
of groups or communities to solve potential
conflicts internally, without having recourse
to explicit legalistic rules of behaviour.  Since
such an ability depends to an important
extent on the history or culture of the society
concerned (an element of social life that
cannot be easily changed), this literature can
be blamed for a false pretention to universal
applicability.  In fact, when communities have
a good problem-solving potential, as many
experiences in Africa testify, trying to impose
formal rules and procedures on them is
counter-productive and involves a consider-
able waste of resources.  However, one should
add, there are various ways of cooperation
between the state and the rural communities
that could help remedy the most glaring
failures of customary tenure systems when
they become subject to strong pressures owing
to rising land scarcity.
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